Credit for Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing by Editors,
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED BETWEEN ARREST
AND SENTENCING
In Cobb v. Bailey,1 the Fifth Circuit ruled that a state prisoner,
indicted for a nonbailable offense and sentenced to the statutory maxi-
mum term, was not constitutionally entitled to receive credit for pre-
sentencing incarceration. Lillian Cobb was arrested and indicted for
murder in the first degree, a nonbailable offense at that time under
Alabama law.2 Six months later, she was convicted of second degree
manslaughter, a misdemeanor, and sentenced to twelve months im-
prisonment in the county jail, the statutory maximum.3 She thus served
eighteen months in jail, although she was convicted of an offense with
a maximum sentence of twelve months.
The court, declining to overrule or distinguish its earlier decision
in Gremillion v. Henderson,4 in which it had stated without qualifica-
tion that "there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time
served prior to sentence,"5 rejected her contention that failure to give
such credit violated her constitutional rights. Noting that Congress had
passed legislation in 1966 requiring such credit to be given to federal
prisoners," the court reasoned that, since such legislation had been
deemed necessary, the right to such credit must not be constitutionally
required. Rather, it concluded that the right to such credit is properly
a creation of state statute or a matter within the discretion of the
sentencing judge.'
The question whether credit for presentence confinement is con-
stitutionally required has arisen infrequently for two reasons. Many
courts have held that if the actual sentence plus presentence time does
not exceed the statutory maximum sentence, there is a presumption
that the sentencing judge gave credit for the presentence time.' Thus,
1469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972).
2 ALA. CoDE tit. 15, § 195 (1959).
3 ALA. CODE fit. 14, § 322 (1959).
4425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970).
5 1d. at 1294.
I 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970). The purposes of the bill and the interpretation given
it by the courts are discussed at notes 11-14 infra & accompanying text.
7 Accord, e.g., Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1970); Burns v.
Crouse, 339 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1964); Jones v. Henry, 317 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D.N.C.
1970); Arsad v. Henry, 317 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Gross v. Sarver, 307 F. Supp.
1105 (ED. Ark. 1970); People v. Jones, 489 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1971); State v. Williams,
262 La. 769, 264 So.2d 638 (1972); Williams v. State, 2 Md. App. 170, 234 A.2d 260
(1967); State v. Crockrell, 470 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1971); Ibsen v. Warden, 86 Nev. 540,
471 P.2d 229 (1970); State v. Walker, 277 N.C. 403, 177 S.E.2d 868 (1970); State v.
Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28 (1970); Burns v. Page, 446 P.2d 622 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1968); State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220 (1968); Bennett v. State,
450 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
8 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 446 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1971); Holt v. United
States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970); Noorlander v. United States, 404 F.2d 603 (8th
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only prisoners like Lillian Cobb, whose combined time in prison ex-
ceeds the maximum sentence, have had standing to challenge the denial
of such credit. And many legislatures have eliminated the problem
by either requiring that credit be given for time spent in pretrial deten-
tion, or authorizing such credit at the discretion of the sentencing
judge.'
This Comment deals only with the rights of an accused jailed
for a nonbailable offense."0 It is here contended that, when a prisoner
is sentenced to a maximum term, a constitutional right to receive credit
for presentence incarceration does exist.
The court's reasoning in Cobb is not persuasive: it ignores the
historical setting of the legislative process. The 1966 bill" clarified an
earlier version'2 by eliminating mention of a minimum mandatory
sentence, which had been interpreted by some courts to be a require-
ment for the granting of credit for pretrial confinement. Ironically,
before 1966 some judges had been denying credit in cases of offenses
which had no minimum sentence.' 3 The passage of a statute which,
Cir. 1968); Huber v. United States, 390 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968); Ashworth v. United
States, 391 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968); Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1966). But see Pedgett v. United States, 387 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1967) (question of pre-
sentence credit is open for determination upon the particular facts of each case).
9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970), discussed at notes 11-14 infra & accompanying
text; ILL. AxN-. STAT. ch. 38, § 119-3 (Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 33A
(1968) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 894 (1964).
In the Fifth Circuit Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 2530 (1972), Louisiana, LA. CODE
CRIm. PRO. art. 880 (Supp. 1972), and Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 2540.5 (Supp.
1972), mandatorily award credit for pretrial incarceration. Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.161 (1973), and Texas, TEx. CODE CRni. Pno. AwN. art. 42.03 (Supp. 1972),
grant the trial judge discretion whether to grant such credit. Alabama appears to have
no law on the subject.
lo If the offense is bailable, and the accused remains in jail due solely to indigence,
serious equal protection issues, beyond the scope of this Comment, arise. In 2 recent
cases, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970),
the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for a state to force an indigent to work off
a fine by incarceration. The court noted:
[O]nce the state has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to
satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain
class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum solely by reason of their indigency.
Id. at 241-42. Several courts have applied this rationale to the practice of denying credit
for presentence incarceration in bailable cases. In such cases those who remain in jail
prior to trial do so due solely to their indigence. This, these courts have held, is a
violation of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971); White v. Gilligan,
351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Culp v. Bounds,
325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971); cf. Williams v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections,
463 F.2d 993 (8th Cir. 1972). Importantly, it also should be noted that these cases
implicitly reject the argument that there is sufficient difference between pre- and post-
trial incarceration to warrant a constitutional distinction under the equal protection
clause. See notes 25-30 infra & accompanying text. Clearly those cases which reject the
claim to credit, see note 7 supra, also implicitly reject the view that equal protection
problems exist.
11 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970) (first paragraph).
1 2 Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-691 § 1(a), 74 Stat. 738, as amended 18
U.S.C. § 3568 (1970).
IsFor an account of the legislative history of the 1966 enactment, see Stapf v.
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by clarifying an ambiguity in an earlier statute, guarantees a right
to credit for pretrial incarceration, cannot realistically be said to negate
the existence of a constitutional right to such credit. The existence of
the statute may be a recognition or confirmation of the basic constitu-
tional right; a conclusion that at least one court has reached.' 4 But
even assuming, as the Cobb court did, that the passage of the statute
confirming the right strongly implies the absence of a constitutional
basis for that right, relevant constitutional jurisprudence may have
advanced since its passage. In fact, decisions such as North Carolina v.
Pearce,'15 Benton v. Maryland' and United States v. Jackson1 have
advanced relevant constitutional law far beyond its 1966 posture,
eroding any support for the Cobb holding furnished by the passage
of the bill. Three constitutional bases emerge from which to derive
a right to credit for presentencing incarceration: the double jeopardy
clause, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and the cruel and
unusual punishment clause.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
There is a clear analogy between the present situation and that
of successful appellants who seek credit for time served on their original
conviction before retrial and resentencing. In North Carolina v. Pearce'8
the Supreme Court held that failure to grant such credit would con-
stitute double jeopardy in violation of the fourteenth amendment.' 9
United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The provision regarding a minimum
mandatory sentence created a dilemma for some judges. Although it had been inserted
to permit judges to give minimum sentences and to provide credit, see id. at 328;
Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550, 558 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 2058, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960), some courts read the provision as granting credit only when a minimum
mandatory sentence was provided. See, e.g., Sawyer v. United States, 376 F.2d 615
(8th Cir. 1967); Powers v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964); Scott v. United States,
326 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1964).
Stapf, which was followed by most circuits, held that the congiessional intention
in 1960 was to extend credit both to those sentences under statutes which had a minimum
term, as well as to those which did not. Since no valid rationale justified distinguishing
between the 2 types of offenses, the court reasoned that a contrary intention would
violate either the due process or the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 446 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1971); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1969); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Smith,
379 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1967); Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967).
But see Sawyer v. United States, 376 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1967); Allen v. United States,
264 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Pa. 1966). Congress, recognizing the cogency of this argument,
eliminated the wording in 1966. See S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965).
14 See Mize v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1971). Although this
case is of little precedential value because of the controlling Fifth Circuit decisions in
Cobb and Gremillion, its reasoning is illuminating. The Cobb court's argument that the
passage of a statute implies the absence of a constitutionally-based right is untenable.
Some statutes, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), far from negating the existence of a
constitutional right, are merely affirmative implementations of those rights.
15395 U.S. 711 (1969).
16395 U.S. 784 (1969).
17390 U.S. 570 (1968).
18395 U.S. 711 (1969).
10 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969),
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The double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishments as well as
multiple" conviction for the same offense.20 This guarantee is violated
"when punishment already exacted for an offense is not fully 'credited'
in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense."'"
The Court in Pearce denoted the constitutional violation as "flagrantly
apparent" and "dramatically evident" in cases involving the imposition
of a maximum sentence upon reconviction,22 but was adamant that the
principle involved was equally applicable to any punishment endured
prior to reconviction.
The broad rationale of Pearce requires that full credit be given
in the present situation. In both, the state has exacted punishment prior
to conviction; in both, the prisoner will have served more time in
prison than the statutory maximum. As one court, which found Pearce
controlling, articulately noted:
Pre-trial detention is nothing less than punishment. An un-
convicted accused who is not allowed ... bail is deprived of
his liberty. His incarceration is indistinguishable in effect
from that of one, such as Pearce, who is retried after obtain-
ing post-conviction relief. In both instances, the power of the
state has been utilized to punish the complainant. Funda-
mental notions of fair play as well as the double jeopardy
clause require that [the defendant] receive credit for pre-
commitment incarceration."
Thus, a failure to grant full credit for presentence incarceration should
be held to violate the double jeopardy clause.24 Unfortunately, many
courts have not found this reasoning persuasive. Several rationales
have been advanced for distinguishing Pearce.
Because under state law the sentence starts only after conviction,
some courts hold that time spent in jail prior to conviction and sentenc-
ing is not punishment, but merely precautionary detention to assure
the defendant's presence at trial. Because punishment is not involved,
the double jeopardy clause is not operative 5 This apparently plausible
argument cannot withstand a deeper examination. 0
2 0 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
21395 U.S. at 718.
22 Id.
2 3 Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
2 1 See Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (E.D.N.C. 1971) ; Culp v. Bounds,
325 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Cf. Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d
1101 (4th Cir. 1970).
2 5 See State v. Walker, 277 N.C. 403, 177 S.E.2d 868 (1970); State v. Virgil, 276
N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28 (1970); State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220 (1968);
Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
26 This argument bears a striking resemblance to that advanced by some courts in
denying credit for time served pursuant to a conviction later found void. These courts
reasoned that since the original conviction was void, the time spent in prison was neither
sentence nor punishment, but simply time spent in prison. See, e.g., Minto v. State,
9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 2d 369 (1913); Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d
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From the perspective of the prisoner this subtle distinction be-
tween pretrial preventive detention and postsentencing punishment is
meaningless; in both he faces the same loss of freedom. As one court
has noted:
Ohio contends that pretrial detention is not punishment be-
cause the defendant has not yet been convicted of a crime.
Given the deplorable condition of most local jails, we find it
difficult to characterize such confinement as anything but
punishment.
Regardless of the statutory purpose, the effect of any incarceration
upon the person detained is punitive within the meaning of the double
jeopardy clause. In an evaluation of constitutional rights, the effect of
a practice upon the individual is determinative.28 Therefore, the pur-
507 (1943). But see King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1938),
recognizing the argument as a hollow legal fiction:
The Government's brief suggests in the vein of Mikado that because the
first sentence was void appellant 'has served no sentence but has merely spent
time in the penitentiary;' that since he should not have been imprisoned as he
was, he was not imprisoned at all.... As other corollaries it might be suggested
that he is liable in quasi-contract for the value of his board and lodging, and
crimifaly liable for obtaining them by false pretenses.
Id. See Whalen, Resentence Without Credit For Time Served; Unequal Protection of the
Laws, 35 MwNn. L. Rav. 239, 240-43 (1951). Pearce implicitly rejects the argument as
well. Of course, the mere resemblance of this argument for distinguishing Pearce to
arguments rejected by Pearce does not destroy its validity. The slightest differences
often become distinctions in constitutional law. Contrived legal fictions, however, should
be frowned upon when vital civil liberties are involved.
27 White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); see Jones v. Whittenberg,
323 F. SUpp. 93 (1971).
28 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). Gault rejected the contention that due process
does not apply to juvenile criminal proceedings, because their purpose is to treat and
rehabilitate, and the procedures used are "'clinical' rather than punitive." Id. at 16.
The Court noted that the practical effects of juvenile proceedings were the same as
those of adult proceedings; therefore due process rights attached.
A boy is charged with misconduct. . . . It is of no constitutional consequence
-and of limited practical meaning-that the institution to which he is com-
mitted is called an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however
euphemistic the title .... the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time....
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require
the procedure of regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due
process.'
Id. at 27-28. See Sawyer v. Clark, 386 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (prisoner is entitled
to credit for time spent in mental hospital for examination under 19 U.S.C. § 3568);
United States ex rel. Pollock v. McGinness, 337 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (state
cannot distinguish between different forms of custody); State v. Lee, 60 N.J. 53, 286
A.2d 52 (1972) (prisoner entitled to credit for time spent in diagnostic center for
observation after sex offense, under statute requiring credit for term of "custodial
sentence" between arrest and imposition of sentence).
The statement in the text is intended to mean only that a practice unconstitutional
in effect should not be saved by reference to statutory purpose. There are, of course,
situations in which an improper motive on the part of the state or its agents will impart
a constitutional taint to an otherwise allowable practice. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Constitutional safeguards like the due process and double jeopardy clauses are pre-
eminently intended for the protection of individual rights, and limit state power only by
necessary implication. One can only speculate on the extent to which contemporary focus
on curbing police and prosecutorial abuse has led some courts to apply the vitiating
factors of improper purpose and improper effect only conjunctively.
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pose of the detention should not alter the conclusion that Pearce
controls.
It has been argued that Pearce is distinguishable from the pre-
trial confinement problem, because in Pearce punishment was infficted
after two trials, while only one is involved in the former situation.2 9
This argument, however, ignores the fact that Pearce applied double
jeopardy because two penalties were meted out, not because two con-
victions were incurred.30 If the key to the problem is the punishment,
and not the conviction, then the fact that in the present case the first
punishment is imposed upon arrest rather than upon conviction is
irrelevant.
Courts have also limited Pearce's application to prisoners whose
noncredited time is spent in a penitentiary, distinguishing nonbailable
detainees in a local jail.3 ' This distinction, while tenable in other con-
texts, 2 is irrelevant to the instant analysis. The argument is essentially
equivalent to the first, but the proffered distinction rests on the name
of the institution and the locale of confinement rather than the motive
for it. It suffers from the same shortcomings, however. How can incar-
ceration be called something other than punishment because it is suf-
fered in a different place or imposed for a different motive? The effect
on the individual, the loss of his liberty dictated by the organized
forces of society, is the same. The constitutional right against double
jeopardy must not be defeated by such hollow verbal distinctions.
Thus, despite the best efforts of courts and prosecutors to the contrary,
the failure to grant credit for presentencing incarceration should be
held to violate the double jeopardy clause as explicated by Pearce.
II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
A price may not be exacted by a state for an individual's exercise
of a constitutional or statutory right,33 unless necessitated by a legiti-
2 9 Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101, 1104 (4th Cir. 1970) (argument
by the Attorney General; the court neither accepted nor rejected the argument, but left
the application of Pearce to the state court).
3 oSee note 21 supra.
3 1 Bennett v. State, 450 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (time spent in county
jail).
3 2 The Supreme Court, recognizing the validity of the distinction, recently held that
local jails are not the equivalent of state prisons in the awarding of good time for deter-
mining parole eligibility, but the Court left open the question of crediting pretrial local
confinement against the prisoner's- full sentence. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263
(1973). As the Court recognized, the New York practice it upheld concerned only the
setting of a parole date: "while New York does deny good time credit for jail time in
computing the minimum parole date under §§ 230(2), and (3), it allows such credit
in calculating the statutory release date under § 230(4)." Id. at 1058 (footnote omitted).
Although the presence or absence of rehabilitative facilities is clearly relevant in deciding
whether a prisoner can be safely paroled, as the Court held in McGinnis, it does not alter
the reality of the punishment inflicted upon a prisoner in a local jail. But see note 28
supra & accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 US. 570 (1968); Comment, The Chilling
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mate state interest.34 The burdened right must, of course, be actually
exercised rather than waived for fear of the consequences.3 5 Pearce
held that, absent identifiable behavior by the prisoner to justify it,
a judge may not impose a harsher sentence on a successful appellant
upon resentencingY6 Thus the state is forbidden to deter or burden
the prisoner's right to appeal, except when the countervailing legitimate
state interest of controlling prison deportment is served.3 7 Some lower
federal courts have extended the Pearce holding, requiring that credit
be granted for time spent in jail from the date of conviction to the date
an appeal is dismissed, although a prisoner does not formally begin
to serve his sentence under state law until the appeal is dismissed3
An accused can extend his period of pretrial confinement in a
number of ways. A simple plea of not guilty, requiring trial, delays
sentencing to the extent that a guilty plea is more quickly disposed of.
Exercising other procedural rights-such as seeking a suppression
hearing--takes still more time. In these situations, there can be no
"legitimate state interest" in denying sentence credit for pretrial con-
finement. The state's interests in bail or pretrial incarceration are to
insure the presence of the accused at trial and to protect the public
from a potentially dangerous recidivist 3 9 Neither interest has a rational
nexus with the denial of credit for time spent in jail; on the contrary,
they may compel a grant of such credit: otherwise the implication arises
that punishment is the purpose of confinement. 40
In many cases there is a voluntary exercise of rights granted by
the state. Wright v. Maryland Penitentiary4, provides an excellent
example. Wright spent over two years in jail from arrest to conviction,
due in large part to his decision to have his first indictment declared
invalid and to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, requiring mental
and physical examination over a period of nearly a year. Although the
court did not decide whether denial of credit for the time thus spent
was an unconstitutional burden, such a denial is extremely chilling to
Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLam. L. REv. 808 (1969); Note, Another Look at
Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
34 Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) with Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding the de novo trial system because of the absence of any
inherent likelihood of vindictiveness).
35 Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) with Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
36395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
3 7 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); cf. Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (barring prosecutorial comment on the accused's failure to
testify).
38 See, e.g., Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. North
Carolina, 438 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970)
(per curiam) (construing Pearce broadly); State v. Williams, 262 La. 769, 264 So. 2d
638 (1972); Ex parte Griffith, 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
39 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
40 Cf. Short v. United States, 344 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
41429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970).
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the exercise of the rights involved 4 This argument is of broad applica-
tion; anytime an accused spends time in jail exercising a right incident
to fair trial, it is a chill upon the exercise of that right to deny credit
for time so spent. Thus, time served in jail during the delay caused
by electing a jury rather than a nonjury trial, or by requesting a hear-
ing on a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence, should be credited
to the accused if he is found guilty.
To extend this analysis further, should not even the period of
detention from the initial plea of not guilty to final sentencing be
credited? The delay is a direct result of the plea of not guilty; failure
to credit it impermissibly burdens the right to plead not guilty. If
viewed from this perspective, the failure to grant credit for post-
arraignment pretrial confinement is as constitutionally suspect as the
failure to grant credit for time spent in jail while appealing a con-
viction.43 In short, denial of credit for pretrial detention may cause
a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect on several of the ac-
cused's rights incident to a fair trial.
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Federal district courts have held that the denial of presentence
credit to prisoners sentenced to a maximum term violates the constitu-
tional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment." Assuming a
maximum sentence, and no distinction between pre- and posttrial
incarceration,45 failure to credit the former results in a period of con-
finement beyond the statutory maximum. Recognizing that fixing
4 2 See note 33 supra.
43 The court in State v. Williams, 262 La. 769, 777-78, 264 So. 2d 638, 641 (1972),
noted as a matter of statutory construction:
In addition, the following [non-constitutional] reasons are suggested why a
defendant should be given credit for time served pending appeal:
(1) Considering the long delays in perfecting an appeal, in lodging the record
in this court, in setting the case for argument, in deciding the case and the
application for rehearing, one could spend more time in jail waiting a final
determination of his appeal than the length of the actual sentence. Delays on
appeal have ranged to over two years in this court.
(2) Article I, Section 12 of the Louisiana Constitution and Article 314 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure require that when the sentence imposed is five
years or longer, a convicted accused cannot be released on bond while his appeal
is pending. Thus, it is inherently unfair to penalize an individual by not giving
him credit for time served while his appeal is being processed, a procedure. over
which he has no control.
(3) Society has extracted its 'debt' when a certain sentence has been imposed
and when the defendant has served that amount of time in prison.
(4) The poor who could not afford to make bond pending an appeal would be
imprisoned longer than those who could afford to make bond.
(5) It discourages a defendant's statutory right to appeal if he is not allowed
credit for time served pending an appeal.
4 4 SCe, e.g., Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (E.D.N.C. 1971). Since a
bailable offense was involved, the equal protection clause provided an independent
base for holding the denial of credit unconstitutional. For a discussion of the double
jeopardy implications of the case, see text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
4 5,See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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penalties for criminal acts is a legislative function, the courts held
sentences beyond the statutory limits constitutionally impermissible
cruel and unusual punishment.4 6
This argument is inapposite to some states; if the relevant sen-
tencing statute grants the trial judge discretion respecting credit for
presentence incarceration,4 7 the question whether he is permitted to
deny credit, mete out the maximum sentence, and remain within the
statutory limits becomes a matter of interpretation of state law. At
least one state court, as a matter of statutory interpretation," has held
the statutory maximum sentence to be a limit on the total time, both
pre- and post-trial, that a prisoner should be confined for one offense.49
The cruel and unusual punishment argument, however, is apposite
to Cobb. Alabama has no statute granting the trial judge such discre-
tion; 5 thus the statutory maximum sentence is the limit upon punish-
ment for any given offense. Since pretrial incarceration is effectively and
constitutionally punishment,5 and statutory justification for the addi-
tional punishment is lacking, this punishment is outside the statutory
limits, rendering it constitutionally impermissible.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is disappointing that the court in Cobb did not discuss the many
constitutional issues involved in greater depth. It can be expected, how-
ever, that other controversies over the pretrial confinement credit ques-
tion will arise shortly, providing courts with opportunities to assure
the right of an accused prisoner to credit for presentence incarceration.
40 Although many lower federal courts have held that sentences within the statutory
limits will not be considered cruel and unusual punishment, see, e.g., United States v.
Lloyd, 431 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tobin, 429 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir.
1970); Andrus v. Turner, 421 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. King, 420 F.2d
946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970), the Supreme Court's recent landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), leaves little doubt that entire statu-
tory schemes may be found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
4  See note 9 supra.
48 For a discussion of relevant nonconstitutional factors properly bearing on statu-
tory interpretation, see note 43 supra.
49Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 468, 275 A.2d 508 (1971); but cf. Williams v. State,
2 Md. App. 170, 234 A.2d 260 (1967).
50 Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068, 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 1972).
51 See text accompanying notes 25-32 supra.
